The semifinal of the World Cup in Italy, held in 1990, between the host country and Argentina, achieved the audience record for a football match in this country, with an average viewer (Marketing TV Rti) of 27.5 million. That was also the last sporting event in which the Italian public television held the exclusivity of the live broadcast of those sporting events. Until then, private channels had to content themselves with deferred 무료스포츠중계. But Law No. 223, of August 6, 1990, on Regulation of the public and private Radio television system, also called Mammy Law 14, changed this situation, allowing private television companies to use live broadcasting on a national scale. From that moment on, the commercial channels had absolute freedom to be able to enter into the game of negotiations on the rights to retransmit sporting events. However, a legislative framework was lacking that would protect not only the interests of the clubs, but also that of the viewers, although the Italian government has always been indecisive on this point (Valori, 2005).
The Italian model, however, has its own complexities.
Contrary to what has been done in other countries, the path taken has gone from ‘centralization’ to ‘decentralization’, to finally move towards a new centralization of television rights negotiations, which has gone from an egalitarian redistribution of rights retransmission to a subjective redistribution of these same rights.
For many years, the clubs delegated their efforts to the Lega Calcio , which was in charge of distributing the income from the centralized sale of these sporting events, and until the 1996-1997 season, the legal basis on which the direct sale and collective of these retransmissions was the Regulation of the Calcio League itself (article 1, section 3).
However, with the emergence at the end of the 1990s of pay television, and the entry of satellite operators – Telepiú (1990) and Stream TV (1996) -, the collective sale of rights was questioned. The big Italian clubs saw the possibility of obtaining higher income than what they had been receiving through Lega Calcio.
From 1997 to 1999, the distribution was made according to the following scale:
58 percent for open television and 75 percent for pay television. The rest of these percentages were based on the classification obtained and the number of televised matches. In 1999, some big clubs signed contracts, individually with Telepiú, transferring the television exploitation rights for encrypted broadcasts and foreign sales for a period of six years (1999-2005). The worst part of these agreements was taken by those modest clubs, who were left without the juicy contracts of the big ones and had to join together to collectively sell their broadcasts.
But the true break in terms of television rights and their marketing modalities comes from an important legislative intervention (Augustine, 2004). As a result of the fact that the second Italian operator, Stream (News Corp) made an offer for all the television rights, the German Government issued Law No. 15, of March 29, 1999, which, in its article , indicated that the same company could not hold more than 60 percent of the rights of the League in pay per view, and the contracts could not exceed three years.